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Lawyers in Colombia: Perspectives on
the Organization and Allocation
of Legal Services.*
DENNIS 0. LYNCHf
INTRODUCTION
This article describes the Colombian legal profession's organization, career
patterns, and methods of allocating and delivering legal services. It is primarily
based on data gathered in early 1974 through interviews with a sample of
Colombian lawyers in Bogotd. 1
The roles of Latin American lawyers and the distribution of their services
merit careful study for a number of reasons. 2 First, Latin American governments
rely heavily on law to organize and regulate a wide range of activities and to
implement public policies. Judges, government lawyers, and the practicing bar
are in a position to shape these laws, and the policies underlying them through
their daily work. Depending on the strength of their monopoly over legal roles,
lawyers may control access to law, to legal and administrative institutions, and
to other sources of state power. They can use legal reasoning to alter or reinforce
the policies embodied in laws, they disseminate information about the law to
private parties, and they provide advice on how to use the law for private gain.
* The field research for this study was carried out while the author was a research
fellow with Yale Law School's "Law and Modernization" program and the complete
study is being submitted for the J.S.D. degree at Yale Law School. The research was
partially financed by a grant from the International Legal Center. The full study will be
published as a part of the series of "Studies of Law in Social Change and Development"
being jointly published by the International Legal Center and the Scandinavian Institute of
African Studies. I wish to thank these institutions for their financial assistance. For their
encouragement and helpful comments, I would like to thank Richard Abel, Clarence Dias,
Yash Ghai, Thomas Heller, Quintin Johnstone, Robin Luckham, Robert Means, James
Paul, Fernando Rojas, and David Trubek. The responsibility for all errors remains mine.
t B.A. 1965, University of Oregon; J.D. 1969, Harvard University; Associate Profes-
sor of Law, University of Miami.
1. For a brief description of the sample design, see text at note 50 infra.
2. There are few empirical studies of the legal profession in Latin America. The most
comprehensive is S. LOWENSTEIN, LAWYERS, LEGAL EDUCATION AND DEVELOPMENT
(1970). See also Urzua, Sociedad y. Sistema Legal: ElPapel delAbogado, 11 CUADERNOS
DE LA REALIDAD NACIONAL (Jan. 1972); L. Zollezi, La Profesi6n de Abogado en Lima
(1976) (unpublished paper based on research carried out by the Instituto de Inves-
tigaciones Juridicas de la Pontifica Universidad Cat6lica del Peru). Cf. J. FUSTER, Los
ABOGADOS DE PUERTO Rico: FUNDAMENTAS PARA UNA SOCIOLOGIA DE LA PROFESION
LEGAL (1974).
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Second, by looking at the profession's control over access to public institu-
tions and over information about law, it may be possible to learn more about the
way the organization of economic and political power shapes the legal order. To
the extent that the profession is dependent on particular economic or political
interests to maintain its financial security, lawyers will have an incentive to use
their monopoly position and legal skills to shape policies to the advantage of
their dominant clientele. This tendency would be strongest among the practicing
bar who sell their services in the market place to the highest bidder. The fee for
service method of allocating legal services may forge linkages between the most
influential and skilled lawyers and the groups who control the nation's capital
and productive resources. In the same sense, it may operate to preclude partial
access to public decisionmaking procedures by those who lack the resources to
purchase legal services.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the validity of this perspective on the
legal profession in the light of the data collected on practicing lawyers in
Bogoti. Of course, legal roles in the judiciary and government agencies are
central to a more comprehensive understanding of the profession, but this article
will focus primarily on the practicing bar. 3 The first section gives a brief
overview of the recent economic, political, and social trends in Colombian
society which are important to an understanding of current legal roles. It is
followed by a description of the relationships among the social origins of
lawyers, the law schools they attend, and the extent of stratification in the bar.
The third section describes the internal organization of the private bar and its
recent efforts to restrict access to membership. The fourth is devoted to an
analysis of the costs and distribution of legal services, and the final one
examines some of the implications of this pattern of distribution and provides a
few thoughts on alternative ways of increasing access to legal services.
I. THE NATIONAL CONTEXT
The prominence of Colombian lawyers in the nation's political life can be
traced back to the country's colonial heritage. The Spanish crown relied heavily
on legal decrees and legal institutions to regulate economic production and to
control the colony's political and social development.4 Legally trained men
staffed the key institutions, and the Colombian system of higher education, 5
3. For a more complete analysis of legal roles in the judiciary, government agencies
and the practicing bar, see D. LYNCH, LAWYERS IN A CHANGING SOCIETY: A CASE STUDY
OF THE COLOMBIAN LEGAL PROFESSION (forthcoming 1978).
4. The major decrees were included in a codification published in Madrid known as
the RECOPILACI6N DE LEYES DEL REINO DE LAS INDIAS encompassing approximately 6,500
decrees divided into nine books regulating the exploitation of land, mines, labor, foreign
trade, the obligations of the Catholic Church, the organization of the colonial government,
and the structure of the education system. RECOPILACION DE LEYES DE LOS REINOS DE LAS
INDIAS (Consejo de la Hispanidad ed. 1943).
5. The acts of the colonial government and its relations with private parties were
controlled by a legal institution known as the Real Audencia. See 14 M. AGUILERA,
HISTORIA EXTENSA DE COLOMBIA: LA LEGISLAcION Y EL DERECHO EN COLOMBIA 73-74
(1965).
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modeled after Spain's universities, stressed law as the basic training for the
children of the dominant classes who were interested in a career other than
medicine or the clergy.' As a result, men trained in law tended to dominate
many of the nation's most prominent public and private roles throughout the
nineteenth century. 7
Over the past fifty years, the traditional importance of lawyers in public roles
has been declining, but their influence in the private sector appears to be
increasing. Changes in the division of labor and the diversification of higher
education have contributed to the formation of new professions. Lawyers now
compete with economists, engineers, and trained administrators for many public
sector roles not directly related to the legal process. At the same time urbaniza-
tion, the growth of commerce, and the expansion of government regulation have
transformed the demand for legal skills in the private sector.
Colombia's change from a predominantly agrarian society with the bulk of
the population engaged in subsistence farming to an urban economy with
growing industrial and commercial sectors began in the 1920's. The high
international price of coffee generated the capital and foreign exchange earnings
to stimulate a sustained period of economic.growth. s From 1938 to 1967 the
percentage of Colombians in major urban centers increased from 30% to 50%.9
During this same period the percentage of the work force engaged in agriculture,
mining, and fishing decreased from around 76% to 45%. 10 Many, but not all, of
the urban migrants were absorbed by the growth in industry and commerce. 1' In
fact, over the past decade unemployment has been estimated at an average of
around 20-25% of the work force. 12
These changes have stimulated the demand for legal services in many areas.
For example, the larger percentage of Colombians working for a wage with
6. For a description of the Spanish university system and the development of higher
education in Latin America, see M. RODRIGUEZ CRUZ, HISTORIA DE LAS UNIVERSIDADES
HiSPANo AMERICANAS (1973).
7. Over half the country's presidents have been graduates of her law faculties. For
biographical information on them, see M. MANUEL, COLOMBIA POSESIONES PRESIDEN-
CIALES 1810-1954 (Bogota 1954); J. DE MENDOZA VELEZ, GOBERNANTES DE COLOMBIA (500
A OS DE HISTORIA) (Bogotd 1957). From 1825 to approximately 1860 there was also a
sharp conflict over the orientation of legal education which reflects the important role it
played in the education of the nation's political leaders. See Rojas, La Batalla de Bentham
en Colombia, 29 REV. DE HISTORIA DE AM-RICA 37 (1950).
8. See R. Dix, COLOMBIA: THE POLITICAL DIMENSIONS OF CHANGE 31-36 (1967); W.
MCGREEVEY, AN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF COLOMBIA 1845-1930, at 183-340 (1971).
9. R. Parra Sandoval, Dependency and Education in Colombian Under-development
14 (1973) (Land Tenure Center at the University of Wisconsin, Research Paper No. 51)
(citing the population censuses of 1938, 1951, and 1964); DEPARTAMENTO ADMINISTRATIVO
NACIONAL DE ESTADiSTICA [DANE], 227 BOLETiN MENSUAL DE ESTADISTICA (1970)
[hereinafter cited as BOLETiN].
10. BOLETIN, supra at 17.
11. Over the past decade Colombia has maintained a growth rate of 5% to 6%. For
discussions of the relationship between economic growth, migration and unemployment,
see the collection of essays in EMPLEO Y DESEMPLEO EN COLOMBIA (Centro de Estudios
Sobre Desarrollo Econ6mico ed. 1968).
12. See OFICINA INT'L DEL TRABAJO, HACIA EL PLENO EMPLEO 18 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as HACIA EL PLENO EMPLEO].
1978]
TEXAS INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
minimum benefits guaranteed by law has fostered a specialization in labor.
Urban migrants need housing and credit which has led to more legal work
concerned with property transfers, mortgage foreclosures, actions of ejectment,
and the collection of debts through garnishment or attachment. 13 Similarly, an
increase in urban crime means more legal work for prosecutors, judges, and
criminal defense attorneys.
The most significant change in the demand for legal services, however, has
been caused by the growth of private business and financial institutions. A few
large corporations, banks, and insurance companies control a major portion of
the nation's capital. 14 They are in a position to hire the best legal talent and this
is having an impact on legal career patterns. The increase in United States
foreign investment by the oil industry and manufacturing enterprises has also
contributed to the formation of Colombian law firms. 15
The basic structure of the Colombian legal order was formed in the middle of
the nineteenth century through the importation and enactment of European legal
codes. The first penal code was adopted in 1837 and the first commercial code
in 1853.16 Both were based on Spanish models. The adaptation by Andres Bello
of the French Napoleonic Civil Code was first enacted by two departments
(states) in 185917 and then by the central government in 1887.
This early codification process appears to have been relatively isolated from
the realities of Colombian life. It may be more linked to the efforts of legally
trained men to build a new nation state patterned after the European metropolis
than any specific economic or legal needs of Colombia. For example, Professor
Means, who has done extensive research on the sources of the commercial code,
found little evidence of any concern over the substantive provisions of the code
governing commercial contract rights or over the lack of government power to
regulate the process of incorporation under the code.' 8 He concludes that for
some time after the enactment of the commercial code, Colombian commercial
groups were largely unaware of its contents. 19
The lack of relation between the codes and Colombia's social system does not
mean, however, that the orientation of the codes has not been a significant factor
13. For a discussion of the areas of specialization of practitioners serving individual
clients in low income areas, see text at note 112 infra.
14. In 1964 only 10% of the Colombian corporations had taxable earnings of over one
million pesos and they earned 85% of the total corporate income for that year. See
Reforma de la Estructura Tributuria de las Sociedades en Colombia: Andlisis de los
Problemas y de las Propuestas Alternativas para su Solucidn, in LEC"URAS SOBRE DESAR-
ROLLO EcON6MIco COLOMBIANO 527-75 (0. Gomez Otalora & E. W. Duran eds. 1974)
(published by Fundaci6n Para La Educaci6n Superior y el Desarrollo).
15. From 1929 to 1966 direct investment from United States sources increased from
$124 million to $576 million. 239 BOLETiN 76 (June 1971). The members of two law firms
serving foreign interests appeared in the sample and the senior partner of another firm was
interviewed during early meetings with select leaders of the legal profession.
16. Means, Codification in Latin America: The Colombian Commercial Code of 1853,
52 TExAs L. REV. 18, 22 (1973).
17. Id. at 22, n. 16.
18. Id. at 25-37.
19. Id. at 36.
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in the formation of the Colombian state. Since its enactment, the Civil Code has
provided the basic framework and set of rules for resolving conflicts between
private parties engaged in civil litigation.20 The study of the Code and the first
principles underlying it have dominated the content of Colombian legal educa-
tion for almost a century.21 The Code is based on the sanctity of private property
and the individual's right to exploit his property as he wishes as long as his
actions do not infringe on the rights of others. The discretion of judges to
interpret the law or give it new meaning with changing social and economic
contexts is strictly limited.22 Judges are to interpret the rules in terms of their
literal meaning. While legal doctrine or scholarship can be used to clarify the
norm's literal meaning, the purpose of the law or its spirit can only be consulted
where other sources still leave its literal meaning vague. Custom is only
important in situations where there is no relevant provision of any code which is
applicable. Even in these situations, the judge should deduce the result by
reasoning from the first principles which give the code its logical consistency.
These principles are formal legal equality, private property, and the moral
precepts of the Catholic faith.'
Most legal reforms in this century appear to be more closely linked to specific
economic or political goals. The first major development was in 1923 when the
Colombian. government retained a commission of experts from the United States
headed by E. W. Kemmerer to make a study and recommend legislation in the
fields of finance, banking, and commerce in anticipation of more foreign
investment.24 A national bank was created to regulate credit and to manage the
money supply, and foreign exchange controls were reformed. These devel-
opments were followed in the 1930's by the enactment of labor legislation,
changes in corporate law to allow for limited liability corporations, and the first
of Colombia's agrarian codes designed to initiate a land reform policy.2
Over the following thirty years, there were a variety of legal changes in all of
these fields, but the next major wave of code reforms occurred in the late 1960's
after the two major parties formed a coalition government known as the National
Front based on an agreement to alternate the presidency between the two parties
over a sixteen year period.26 This agreement eased political tensions among the
20. The Civil Code of Colombia is basically the same one adopted by Law No. 153 of
1887. See 1 A. VALENCIA ZEA, DERECHO CIVIL: PARTE GENERAL Y PERSONAS 33-44 (5th
ed. 1972).
21. After the adoption of Andres Bello's Civil Code all Colombian law students were
required to study the sections of the civil code on legal personalities, family law, property,
contracts, and extra-contractual obligations. They remain as basic required courses in all
Colombian law schools today. See Decree-Law No. 225 of 1977, DERECHO COLOMBIANO
No. 183, at 267-73 (Mar. 1977).
22. See C6DIGO CIVIL, arts. 25-32 (Ortega Torres ed, 1972) [hereinafter cited as
C6DIGO CIVIL].
23. C6DIGO CIVIL, arts. 8, 25-33.
24. M. AGUILERA, supra note 5, at 309-17.
25. Id.
26. The conservative and liberal party leaders agreed to divide evenly the positions in
all public elective bodies, executive departments and administrative posts. The presidency
was to alternate between the two parties every four years for a sixteen year period. See R.
Dix, supra note 8, at 136.
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dominant groups who had been in a struggle to control the central government,
and it enabled them to focus their attention on bureaucratic reforms and econom-
ic planning. The court system was reorganized; there were reforms of the codes
in criminal law, commercial law, civil procedure, and mining and oil. There
were three new efforts at agrarian reform, and finally, a constitutional reform
weakened the legislature's power and strengthened that of the executive and the
office of national planning. 27
Another trend with important implications for the legal profession has been
the expansion and diversification of the university system to meet the demands
for higher education from the growing middle class and to provide the tech-
nological skills needed in the industrial sector. At the beginning of this century,
there were five universities in Colombia, four public and one private. 28 From
1900 to 1940, four new private universities were opened and one new public
university. 29 The private ones were essentially law faculties founded by political
parties as alternatives to the public law schools controlled by the opposition
party. 30 The fields of specialization were still mostly limited to law, medicine,
dentistry, engineering, education, and agronomy. 3 1
After 1940 there was a boom in higher education. Thirty-two new universities
were founded from 1941 to 1967, over half of them after 1960.32 Degrees began
to be offered in economics, public administration, the social sciences, and the
humanities. Prior to this time students interested in these fields had studied law,
This caused a decline in the percentage of university students graduating from
law faculties from 54% in the late thirties, to about 15% in the late sixties.33
During the same period, the number of students enrolled in higher education
increased from approximately 3,000 to over 62 ,000 .34 This is an admirable
expansion in higher education, but it is still only 3.7% of the university age
population.35
This rapid expansion in higher education has directly influenced the legal
profession in two ways. First, law graduates must now compete in the public
and private sectors for positions they had previously occupied because law was a
basic field of study for most nonscientific occupations. This is a natural result of
specialization and diversification in higher education, but it does make lawyers
27. For an analysis of the reforms initiated under the National Front agreement, see I
F. LEAL BurrRAoO, ESTUDIO DEL COMPORTAMIENTO LEGISLATIVA EN COLOMBIA:
ANALYSIS HISTORICO DEL DESARROLLO POLITICo NACIONAL 1930-1970, at 151-84 (1973).
28. The private university was Rosario and the four public ones were Antioqula,
Cartagena, Cauca, and Nacional. For a complete list of the universities founded from 1653
to 1967, see G. RAMA, EL SISTEMA UNIVERSITiRIO EN COLOMBIA app. cuadro 4 (1970).
29. Id.
30. Liberal party leaders founded Externado de Colombia and Universidad Libre and
the conservative party encouraged the Catholic Church to found the law schools at
Universidad Javeriana and Universidad Pontifica Bolivariana.
31. G. RAMA, supra note 28, app. cuadro 18.
32. Id. app. cuadro 4.
33. Id. app. cuadro 18.
34. Id.
35. See HACIA EL PLENO EMPLEO, supra note 12, at 455.
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less prominent at the highest levels of government, industry, and commerce.
The change has contributed to a general image of the legal profession's declin-
ing prestige.
Second, a wider segment of the Colombian population is also obtaining
access to the legal profession due to the founding of more urban night law
schools. Colombian law faculties have traditionally operated with little or no
full-time faculty and only limited library facilities. 36 All that has been needed to
open a law school is classroom space, a limited collection of law books, and
practicing attorneys who are willing to teach part time for a small salary and the
additional contacts and prestige which come with being a professor. Given the
demand for higher education and the large classes in law faculties, operating a
law school became a potentially profitable activity for a university.
There were at least twenty-seven law faculties operating in 1974, five of
which still lacked government approval. Sixteen of these had been founded
since 1950 and about eight had been started in the early 1970's.37 Most of the
recently founded faculties have structured their curriculum to allow students to
work a full day and still obtain a law degree within the basic five years. 38 These
urban night law schools accounted for approximately two-thirds of the students
enrolled in law in 1973, and in the eight years prior to 1973, the overall number
of law students approximately tripled. 39
The legal profession has recently responded to these developments to protect
its monopoly position. Lawyers argue that the increased access to membership
in the profession and the lower quality education is destroying the profession's
prestige.' In 1974, the Ministry of Justice established a more stringent set of
minimum standards for the operation of a law faculty and government supervi-
sion was increased.41 Whether these steps will eventually mean a reduction in
the size and number of law faculties remains to be seen.
The most important trend in the political sphere has been the increase in
36. In 1966 only 4.5% of Colombia's law professors taught full time. This compares
with 43.6% in medicine and health related fields, 16.4% in economics, 30% in education,
33% in engineering, and 71% in agronomy. 219 BOLETiN 183 (June 1969).
37. The ones founded prior to 1950 are Rosario, Antioquia, Cartagena, Cauca, Atldn-
tico, Nacional, Narino, Externado, Libre, Javeriana, Bolivariana, and Caldas. After 1950
came Medellin, Santo Tomis en Bogotd, La Gran Colombia en Bogoti, La Gran Colombia
en Armenia, La Libre en Pereira, Santiago de Cali, Aut6noma Latinoamericana, San
Buenaventura, Aut6noma de Bogota, La Cat6lica, Los Andes, Santo Tomfis en
Bucaramanga, Libre en Cdicuta, Libre en Barranquilla, Inca de Colombia. The informa-
tion was obtained from the records of the Colombian Institute for Higher Education
(ICFES).
38. Classes are held from 7:00 a.m. to 9:00 a.m. and after 5:00 p.m..
39. Evoluci6n de la Matricula en las Facultades de Derecho durante 1965-1973 (a table
prepared for the internal reporting of ICFES).
40. Eighty percent of respondents felt that the profession had a negative public image
and 65% felt its prestige was declining. When asked about the reasons for the profession's
declining prestige 30% mentioned the growth of the urban night schools and 44% pointed
to the excessive competition and lack of ethical standards. Forty-two percent also felt that
the decline in the quality of legal education was the bar's greatest problem.
41. See Decree-Law No. 1189 of 1974.
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government planning and the use of regulatory laws. Recent analyses of the
Colombian political process have stressed the emergence of a "modernization"
trend among the leadership of the Liberal and Conservative parties.4 2 The
"modernists" are described as sharing the belief that the public sector must take
the lead in the development process.43 Their critical policy instrument is the
public investment budget. They advocate using it to develop an economic
infrastructtre and to eliminate economic bottlenecks. 44 Decentralized govern-
ment agencies and public development corporations which operate directly
under the President and outside of the normal forms of legislative control have
been created to pursue these goals.45 There is also detailed government regula-
tion of the market mechanisms and control over the allocation of scarce re-
sources such as foreign exchange.46 The government regulations are different in
their character than traditional legal codes in that they embody specific policies
to direct private economic activity rather than setting a general framework to
facilitate private action.47 Nevertheless, they are legal rules, and lawyers play a
major role in their implementation and interpretation. 48
These trends raise many interesting questions about the way the legal profes-
sion will adjust its roles, organization, and skills to the changing circumstances.
The increase in the bar's size and the heterogeneity which must accompany the
growing access to legal education will have an impact on the organization of
legal services. Legal career patterns and working environments will be altered
by the demand for new types of legal skills in the private sector. At the same
time, the government's expanding role in the distribution of scarce resources
42. See R. Dix, supra note 8, at 50-55; R. NELSON, T. P. SHULTZ & R. SLIGHTON,
STRUCrURAL CHANGE IN A DEVELOPING ECONOMY: COLOMBIA'S PROBLEMS AND PROS-
PECTs 213-35 (1971) [hereinafter cited as R. NELSON].
43. R. NELSON, supra note 42, at 225.
44. Id.
45. For a political science perspective on these reforms, see F. LEAL BUITRAGO,
supra note 27, at 151-84. The best historical account is J. VIDAL PERDOMO, HISTORIA DE
LA REFORMA CONSTITUCIONAL DE 1968 Y sus ALCANCES JURiDICAS (1970).
46. Some of the major areas where the Colombian government is using planning and
regulatory law to achieve developmental objectives are as follows: foreign exchange and
the balance of payments through the Central Monetary Board; the public investment
budget by National Planning; the import-export activity through INCOMEX and PROEX-
PO; the agrarian sector through the institute for agrarian reform (INCORA) and 13
additional decentralized development corporations, credit sources, and marketing agents;
housing and urban growth by the public housing agency (ICT), the Mortgage Bank (BCH),
and municipal planning offices which regulate private urbanizations; 12 public devel-
opment corporations to administer the implementation of the investment budget; and
regulatory agencies charged with the regulation of corporations, banks, cooperatives, and
insurance companies. For an overview of the budgetary allocations among these institu-
tions from 1964 to 1973, see CONTRALORIA GENERAL DE LA REPUBLICA DE COLOMBIA,
CIFRAs FIsCALES (1974). For a discussion of the limitations the dominant economic groups
exercise over public sector planning by the National Front coalition, see F. LEAL BUIT-
RAGO, supra note 27, at 151-93.
47. See Trubek, Toward a Social Theory of Law: An Essay on the Study of Law and
Development, 82 YALE L.J. 1, 30-31 (1972); R. UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY 193-200
(1976).
48. For an analysis of the way this change in the use of law has influenced legal roles
in the Colombian public sector see D. LYNCH, supra note 3.
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and the benefits of economic growth makes more critical an understanding of
the way the organization of legal services influences access to public institu-
tions. To explore these issues such variables as the social origins of lawyers,
legal career patterns, the size of the bar, the cost of legal services, the type of
clientele lawyers serve and the tasks they perform must be examined in the light
of their relationship to the society's class structure, economic order, and politic-
al system.
As noted in the introduction, the basic research which is used to analyze these
issues was conducted in early 1974. Interviews were carried out with a random
sample of law school graduates from law faculties located in Bogotd. Fiverof the
Bogoti law schools had only recently begun offering degrees in law so a
decision was made to concentrate on the six faculties which had educated the
majority of the city's attorneys over the past twenty-five years. They included
private law schools with a reputation for educating the leaders of the bar and
many prominent political figures, the public supported national law school, and
two schools with large night sections which were regarded as avenues of upward
mobility for the middle class.49 The sample population was stratified by combi-
nations of schools to ensure that a cross section of the bar would be interviewed
and the sample included one graduation period in the early fifties and another in
the mid-sixties to make sure an age spread was obtained. 50
The sample design created a bias in the data because a similar number of
lawyers were interviewed from both the elite private schools and from the
faculties with large night sections; the latter actually make up the largest
percentage of the practicing bar. Any adjustment for this bias would have
limited the interviews with the elite school graduates, however, and it was
assumed that their careers and work would be the most interesting in terms of the
relationships between legal services and the needs of the most powerful econom-
49. A 1967 study of the legal profession had included data on the social origins of
lawyers by law school and it provided a basis for the following groupings: (a) Javeriana
and Rosario, (b) Externado de Colombia and National U., and (c) Libre and Gran
Colombia.
50. For the three groupings of the law faculties, see note 49 supra. The two periods
were 1950-51 and 1966-67, with the exception of Gran Colombia which had its first
graduating class in 1957. A 1957-58 list of graduates was used from that school and
combined with the 1950-51 graduates of Libre for purposes of drawing the sample. An
effort was made to interview approximately 20 law graduates from the two different time
periods for each of the three groupings of law faculties. The difficulties I encountered
locating the Libre and Gran Colombia graduates led to the following final distribution of
persons interviewed:
1950-51 1966-67
Rosario and Javeriana 19 20
Externado and National U. 17 20
Libre and Gran Colombia 14* 13
totals 50 53
* 1957-58 for Gran Colombia.
A more complete explanation of the research methodology can be found in D. LYNCH,
supra note 3.
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ic and political interest groups. This methodology also forced the author to
interview lawyers in a wide variety of work settings. In a sense, the results
should be viewed primarily as impressionistic in terms of what was learned
through the interviewing process.
II. THE SOCIAL ORIGINS OF LAWYERS, CAREER PATTERNS,
AND STRATIFICATION IN THE BAR
Most lawyers enjoy a relatively privileged position in Colombian society, but
they are far from a homogeneous group. Career patterns reflect a combination of
the respondents' social origins, personal and family contacts, and the law school
where they studied. The bar is stratified internally by the type of client served,
area of specialization, and the working environment. Attorney-client relations
vary widely depending upon the position of a client in the class structure.
As a group, lawyers tend to be a part of the Colombian upper middle class.51
They are, by definition, university graduates which places them in approximate-
ly the upper 2% of all Colombians in terms of education. 52 The respondent with
the lowest income was a lower level judge earning 6,500 pesos a month, (U.S.
$260), 51 and his monthly salary still left him in the upper 10% of the Bogoti
working population. 54 The mean income of all respondents was approximately
24,400 pesos monthly (U.S. $976.00) which placed the average respondent's
personal income in the upper 1% of the work force in Bogotf. 55
The lawyer's social relations with other Colombians also confirmed this
upper-middle class status. Only 16% of the respondents included someone other
than another professional, a large landowner, or a business executive among
their best friends. Approximately 70% only interacted socially with other pro-
fessionals, and one-third of the respondents limited themselves to close friend-
ships with other lawyers.
In addition, most law graduates come from families which have already
achieved some degree of middle class status. This conclusion is based on
comparisons of the relationship between the education and occupation of the
respondents' fathers and similar information on all Colombian men who were in
the forty to fifty-nine age group at the time of the 1964 census. As Table I
illustrates, only 3% of the respondents' fathers never finished primary school, as
compared with 78% of all Colombian men of a similar age. Sixty-eight percent
of the law graduates' fathers had attained an educational level which placed
them in the upper 3.3% of their generation. Even in the case of the law faculties
51. For an analysis of the Colombian class structure, see T. L. SMITH, COLOMBIA:
SOCIAL STRUCrURE AND THE PROCESS OF DEVELOPMENT (1967).
52. HACIA EL PLENO EMPLEO, supra note 12, at 455.
53. The average exchange rate during the interviews from Jan. - June 1974 was US
$I=25 Colombian pesos.
54. See DANE, ENCUESTA DE HOGARES 120, cuadro 18 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
ENCUESTA DE HOGARES]. The 1970 income figures given in this table were adjusted by a
factor of 170% for inflation between 1970-1974 before making the comparison with the
monthly. incomes of respondents.
55. Id.
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with large night school sections, over 54% of the respondents' fathers had
finished secondary school.
TABLE I
COMPARISON BETWEEN THE EDUCATIONAL LEVEL OF RESPONDENTS'
FATHERS AND THE EDUCATIONAL LEVEL FOR ALL
COLOMBIAN MEN BETWEEN THE AGES OF
FORTY TO FIFTY-NINE IN 1964*
All Colombian
Men Between the
Ages of Forty
to Fifty-Nine
in 1964"*
LEVEL OF
EDUCATION
No Formal
Schooling
Primary
Incomplete
Primary
Complete
Secondary
Incomplete
Secondary
Complete
University
Incomplete
University
Complete
30.1%
47.8%
11
7
1
All
Respondents'
Fathers
[N= 102]
3
Fathers of
Respondents
from Javeriana
and Rosario
[N=39]
4
Fathers of
Respondents
from
Externado
and National
University
[N=37]
Fathers of
Respondents
from Libre
and Gran
Colombia
[N=26]
3% 3% 3% 4%
.4% 15%
.4% 14%
.6% 35%
.3% 6%
5% 16%
13%
38%
0%
41%
38%
8%
8%
* In 1964 the youngest of respondents would have been between the ages of twenty to
twenty-five so most of their parents would have been in their forties. Most of the
older respondents would have been between thirty-six and forty-five which would
correspond with their fathers being in their late fifties and early sixties. The educa-
tional level for all Colombian men over sixty in 1964 is lower than that of the men
forty to fifty-nine, thereby resulting in a bias in Column 1 which overestimates
slightly the educational level for all Colombians in the exact same age group as
respondents' fathers.
** Source: G.W. RAMA, EL SISTEMA UNIVERSITARIO EN COLOMBIA 76 (Bogota 1970)
(citing 8 CENSO DE POBLACION (July 1964)) [hereinafter cited G. W. RAMA].
There are, however, some differences among the law schools in the status of
the families from which they draw their students.5 6 The fathers of graduates
56. A test of the relationship between the three groupings of the law schools and the
level of father's education yielded a Spearman correlation coefficient of .28, significant at
the .002 level.
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from the two small private law schools, Rosario and Javeriana, are the most
likely to hold a university degree and very few have failed to finish at least a
primary education. At the other extreme, few of the graduates of Gran Colombia
or Libre come from families where the father has achieved the education of a
professional.
The results were similar in the case of their fathers' occupations. Table II
gives a picture of the relationship between the occupational distribution of the
Colombian work force in 1964 and the occupations of the interviewees' fathers.
The distribution among respondents' fathers is the inverse image of the distribu-
tion among all economically active Colombians. Ninety-four percent of the
respondents' fathers were engaged in occupations which placed them in the
upper 25% of Colombia's occupational structure. The relationships among law
TABLE II
THE MAJOR OCCUPATIONS OF RESPONDENTS' FATHERS COMPARED
WITH THE DISTRIBUTION OF ALL ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE
COLOMBIANS IN 1964*
[N= 102]
OCCUPATION
1964 Census
Respondents' of the Colombian
Fathers Population
I. Day Laborers
2. Small Farmer
3. Small Merchant
4. Salaried Employees without Special Formal
Education
5. Medium Size Landowners with Permanent
Employees
6. Medium Size Commerce with Staff of Permanent
Employees
7. Salaried Employees with Special Formal Education
or Technical Training after Secondary Education
8. Professionals and High Level Public Officials and
Administrators
9. Owner or Executive of Large Industrial, Commer-
cial, or Financial Enterprise
10. Large Landowner
45%
26%*
15%0
12%
20% 9%,
8% 2%
* Source: G.W. RAMA, supra Table I, at 82, citing the 8 CENSO DE POBLACION
(July 1964)).
** The occupational categories used for the 1964 census do not correspond exactly to
the ones used in this study. This figure in the census includes all independent
workers, other than professionals and technically trained individuals, who are not
employees with a permanent staff. It comes the closest to matching this study's
category of the independent merchant and individual farmer.
*** This figure actually includes all employers from the smallest to the largest. Thus, a
small percentage of this group actually belongs in occupational categories nine and
ten and some may be small merchants with one permanent employee.
**** Since this figure represents the high level executives in the private sector and
administrators in the public sector, it partially overlaps with category 8.
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schools parallel the findings on the educational level of fathers.57 Over half of
the fathers of graduates of Rosario and Javeriana were professionals, important
public figures, large landowners, or executives in private institutions. The same
figure for Gran Colombia and Libre was only 16%. (See Table I1).
TABLE III
OCCUPATION OF RESPONDENT'S FATHER BY RESPONDENT'S LAW SCHOOL
AND DATE OF GRADUATION
OCCUPATIONAL GROUPINGS
1 2
Small Farmer Salaried Employees
Without Technical
Small Merchant Training
3
Employees with
Formal Training
& Owners Medium
Size Farms &
Commerical
Enterprises
4
Professionals
High
Level Public
Officials &
Adminis-
trators
5
Large Landowners
Owner or
Executive of
Large Industrial
Commerical or
Financial Entity
LAW SCHOOLS
Javeriana &
Rosario
1950-51
Graduates
1966-67
Graduates
All Graduates
National U &
Externado
1950-51
Graduates
1966-67
Graduates
All Graduates
Libre &
Gran Colombia
1950-51
Graduates*
1966-67
Graduates
All Graduates
All Respond-
ents
0% 15%
0% 35%
8% 33%
6% 6% 24%
5% 20% 50%
5% 14%
8% 23%
6% 13%
1978]
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* 1957-58 for Gran Colombia
57. A statistical test of the relationship between law school and father's occupation
resulted in a Spearman correlation coefficient of .32, significance .001.
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The pattern in the differences among the law schools also appears in the data
on the respondents' careers and current occupations. 58 To a limited degree,
Rosario and Javeriana still play the role of educating the generalists of the
dominant economic groups, particularly in the financial and corporate sector.
(See Table IV). A majority of the graduates from these two schools are either
executives in a bank, insurance company or a public utility or they are indepen-
dent legal advisors with private companies as their major clientele.59 In contrast,
70% of the respondents from Libre and Gran Colombia are litigators in private
practice representing individual clients, primarily from the middle and lower
classes.' None of them are business executives or corporate legal advisors. The
occupational distribution for the National University and Externado is again
between these two extremes.
58. The Spearman correlation coefficient for law school and current occupation is .41,
significance .001.
59. Fourteen of the 21 respondents engaged in nonlaw occupations are graduates of
Rosario and Javeriana. Ten of the 14 are executives in the following types of institutions:
financial institutions, three; semi-public corporations, three; a cooperative, one; a private
lobbying association, one; a private university, one; and a foreign corporation, one.
.60. Of the 19 litigants from Libre and Gran Colombia, 12 (63%) represented primarily
small merchants, employees, small farmers and blue-collar workers. Only one had a
corporation as his major client and this was in the labor field. The remaining six had a
mixture of individual clients from different strata of Colombian society.
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TABLE IV
CURRENT OCCUPATION OF RESPONDENTS BY LAW SCHOOL
1 2 3 4
Graduates of
All Javeriana Externado Gran Colombia
Respondents & Rosario & National U. & Libre
CURRENT OCCUPATION [N=101.] [N=38] [N=36] [N=27]
1. Judge, Prosecutor, or 5% 0 8% 7%
Other Position in a
Legal Institution be-
low the Level of a
Superior Court of a
Department
2. Salaried on the Legal 1% 0 3% 0
Staff of a Govern-
ment Agency
3. Salaried on the Legal 3% 3% 6% 0
Staff of a Private In-
stitution
4. Independent Corn- 4% 3% 6% 4%
merical Activity
5. Head of a Depart- 1% 3% 0 0
ment with Non legal
Functions in a Gov-
ernment Agency
6. Head of a Depart- 1% 0 0 4%
ment with Non law
Functions in a Private
Institution
7. Head of Legal De- 5% 0 8% 7%
partment in a Govern-
ment Agency
8. Head of a Legal De- 4% 3% 8% 0
partment in a Private
Institution
9. Private Practitioner 40% 24% 33%- 70%
Primarily Engaged in
Litigation
10. Magistrate on the 3% 5% 0 4%
Superior Court of a
Department or the
Colombian Supreme
Court or Counsel of
State
11. Law Professor (Full- 2% 3% 0 4%
time)
12. High Level Adminis- 3% 5% 3% 0
trator in Public Agen-
cy or Politician
13. Executive in Private 12% 26% 6% 0
Institution
14. Private Attorney Pri- 17% 26% 19% 0
marily Serving as
Legal Advisor or
Planner
* Two respondents had retired.
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At the more general level, approximately 70% of respondents are engaged in
occupations reserved by law for members of the bar. Most work in the private
sector as litigators or legal advisors to corporations. 6' Only 8% were working in
the legal process as judges, magistrates, or prosecutors, and 6% as legal
advisors to government agencies. These results, however, are more a reflection
of the current level of the .respondents' legal careers than an indication of the
actual percentage of Bogoti law graduates working in public sector legal
positions.
As Table V illustrates, most young Colombian lawyers obtained their first
practical legal experience working as a judge or in a government agency. The
typical respondent obtained his first position as a municipal court judge shortly
after graduation. After one or two promotions in the judiciary, he moved to a
position on a government legal staff. These positions provided practical legal
training and the opportunity to develop contacts among a network of lawyers
and potential clients. After about four to five years in these public sector
positions, the lawyer normally enters private practice or seeks a higher salaried
position in a private institution. If he cannot make more in private practice after
a couple of years than he would earn on the legal staff of a government agency
or at an intermediate level in the judiciary, he often returns to a public sector
legal position. He then remains in the public sector until he retires with a
pension and can enter private practice to supplement his guaranteed pension
income.
TABLE V
OCCUPATIONAL HISTORY OF RESPONDENTS
[N= 103]
Percentage of
Respondents' Respondents
First Position Working in Each
after Gradua. Occupation at
tion from Law Some Time dur- Current
TYPE OF WORK School ing Their Career Occupation
1. Private Practice 11% 74% 55%
2. As a Judge or Prosecutor in the
Court System 47% 70% 8%
3. In a Government Position other
than the Legal Process 25% 50% 10%
4. In a Private or Semi-public In-
stitution 15% 31% 20%
5. Other 2% 7%
61. Respondents were classified as litigators or legal advisors according to the follow-
ing criteria: (a) if they devoted more than 50% of their time to legal problems involving
court litigation, they were classified as litigators; (b) if they devoted more than 50% of
their time to planning the legal affairs of clients to prevent future legal problems, they
were classified as legal advisors; and (c) if neither of these functions absorbed more than
50% of their practice because of the time they devoted to settling existing legal conflicts
prior to the initiation of court litigation or administrative procedures, then they were
classified according to whether their overall practice was more oriented to litigating or
legal planning.
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There were many variations of this typical pattern. If the lawyer was success-
ful in private practice, he still might return to government for a limited period of
time to hold a political office or to work as a high level administrator or legal
advisor to a ministry. His public salary would normally be less than his income
from private practice during this period, but he could anticipate making up for
any loss when he returned to private practice. His government experience and
contacts would increase the value of his subsequent legal services representing
private interests before government agencies.
This pattern of moving from the judiciary to a government agency and then
into private practice with the option to return to the public sector is not common
to many civil law nations. In fact, the tradition in most European civil law
jurisdictions is for young law graduates to make a choice among a variety of
distinct career lines shortly after graduation. Professor Merryman describes the
law graduate's situation in a typical civil law jurisdiction as follows:
He can embark on a career as a judge, a public prosecutor, a govern-
ment lawyer, an advocate, or a notary. He must make this decision
early and then live with it. Although it is theoretically possible to move
from one of these professions to another, such moves are comparative-
ly rare. 62
There are undoubtedly many reasons why legal careers in Colombia deviate
from the typical European civil law jurisdiction, but the major cause is probably
the low salaries of judges and government lawyers and their lack of prestige
within the legal community. The government's recent efforts to create a career
judiciary have not been supported by sufficient public funds to pay judges a
salary similar to the earnings of the average private attorney. Prior to the
expansion of the private demand for legal services due to the growth in
commerce and industry, public legal positions may have been comparatively
more attractive, but today they are mostly a training ground for young lawyers
and a fallback for the attorney who does not do well in private practice.
These observations are supported by the data on the respondents' incomes. At
the time of the interviews, judicial salaries ranged from approximately 5,400
pesos monthly for a municipal court judge to 12,000 pesos for a magistrate of
the highest district court.63 Of course, a justice of the Supreme Court enjoys
considerable prestige, but he earns only 20,000 pesos monthly. The average
private practitioner in the sample earned around 25,000 pesos monthly and no
private attorney admitted to earning less than 10,000 pesos. (See Table VI).
Similarly, the top salary for a government lawyer is about at the level of the
average private attorney. A government staff lawyer earned from 6,500 pesos to
10,500 pesos which makes the salary of the best staff attorney's job about
equivalent to that of the least well off practicing lawyer. Public sector salaries
appear to set the lower limits on the cost of private legal services.
62. J. H. MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL
SYSTEMS OF WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 109 (1969).
63. These figures are based on the income information provided by a young judge
who was just starting his career and who was interviewed during the pretest, and the
Magistrates interviewed as a part of the sample.
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TABLE VI
A COMPARISON OF THE MEAN AND MEDIAN INCOME OF
GOVERNMENT LAWYERS, PRIVATE PRACTITIONERS,
AND LAWYERS IN PRIVATE OR SEMI-PRIVATE
INSTITUTIONS
1 2 3 4
Top Government Salaried Lawyers
Legal Advisors Salaried Lawyers Private in Private or Semi.
from Sample of in Government Posi- Practitioners Private Bureaucracies
Government tions from Sample from Sample of from Law Graduate
Lawyers* of Law Graduates Law Graduates Sample
[N=20] [N=10] [N=45] (N= 17]
Mean Income 14,450 16,500 25,300 23,800
Median Income 13,500 16,000 22,000 25,000
Range 8,000 6,500 10,000 7,000
to to to to
22,500 26,500 99,000 70,000
* This sample was selected at random from a list of the fifty-six most influential
national government agencies. From the fifty-six, a sample of twenty institutions was
drawn. From each of the sample institutions either the head of the legal staff or the
principal legal advisor was intervieed.
The implications of these career patterns are difficult to assess, but some
tentative conclusions are possible. The fact that lawyers tend to work for the
government when they are young and inexperienced or when they do not
succeed in private practice suggests that the quality of legal services in the
public sector is likely to be inferior to the legal counseling obtained by private
clients. In addition, the more competent young attorneys have an incentive to
use their government position to develop contracts which will eventually ad-
vance their private legal careers. If this is true, one would expect to find tension
in public legal roles when the legal or policy interests the government attorney
represents are in conflict with the interests of the clients the attorney eventually
hopes to serve in the private sector.
64
A second important consequence of the career patterns is the limited legal
capability of the judiciary. The low salaries increase the potential for legal
outcomes to be determined by bribery. The backlog in the court calendar and the
low quality of the judiciary may also reduce the predictability of legal outcomes.
This, in turn, will probably encourage the use of alternative methods to resolve
disputes.
One cannot automatically assume that fostering more private dispute resolu-
tion is a negative result. The amount of public resources needed to attract better
quality lawyers to the judiciary and to hire enough judges to reduce the backlog
would be substantial. In a developing society with limited public investment
funds, the costs in terms of the alternative uses of the resources may be high.
The benefits are not clear.
64. See D. LYNCH, supra note 3.
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Disputes between business entities or members of the dominant economic
class are normally resolved through negotiations and settlements in which
private attorneys play an important role.65 The one area in which the courts are
relatively effective today is that of conflicts between institutions and individu-
als, such as the collection of debts, the repossession of property, or the
foreclosure on a mortgage. The procedures are quick and they permit few
defenses if the plaintiff satisfies the formal written requirements. Improving
these procedures might make credit cheaper, but it is difficult to believe it would
improve the overall position of low income groups.
Little is known about the way individuals in the lower classes resolve
conflicts among themselves. Studies have found that local public officials,
priests, political party officials, community patrons, and neighborhood govern-
ing bodies all have the potential to play roles as mediators or arbitrators of
disputes. 6 Improving the quality of the judiciary will not influence these
patterns of conflict resolution unless these groups have access to private attor-
neys to present their case. The access issues are related to the distribution and
costs of private legal services discussed in Part IV. Before turning to these
issues, however, some additional discussion is needed of the factors which
influence legal careers and the pattern of stratification in the bar, and in Part
I, the implications of these findings for the internal organization of the
profession.
Family connections are important for an attorney's career, but interestingly,
the data suggests that the law school a person attends is the most important
variable. In fact, the relationship between the status of a respondent's family and
his current occupation and income disappears when controlled for the influence
of the law faculty.67 A family's status is an important factor in determining
where a person studies, but once a student is enrolled in law school, his place of
study becomes the most important element for his future career.
These conclusions are consistent with the respondents' general observations
on the factors which determine a lawyer's career. Table VII summarizes re-
spondents' specific views on this topic, but their general comments were
actually more interesting. In discussing how a young lawyer obtains a good job
and becomes a success, the graduates of the night schools combined a
65. This observation is based on respondents' answers to a question about the
percentage of their clientele's conflicts which they normally settle without initiating any
legal action.
66. See Fundaci6n para la Educaci6n Superior y el Desarrollo, Derecho y Desarrollo
Urbano: configuraciones juridicas sobre relaciones de propiedad de terrenos en las ur-
banizaciones (Aug. 1974) (a report on research in progress); cf. K. KARST, M. SCHWARTz
& A. ScHWARTZ, THE EVOLUTION OF LAW IN THE BARRIOS OF CARACAS (1973).
67. An indicator of social and economic status (SES) was constructed out of a
combination of father's education, mother's education, and father's occupation. The
correlation between the SES variable and current occupation was only .13, significance
.089, and when controlled for university there was no relationship. The correlation
coefficient between law school and current occupation is .41, significance .001. When it is
controlled for the effects of SES, the relationship is reduced to .23, significance .020.
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graduate's law school, social relations and political contacts. They claimed the
deans and professors of Rosario, Javeriana and Externado form the core of a
network which guides the careers of their law graduates. The schools use the
influence of their older graduates and professors to place young lawyers. The
professors serve as contacts who recommend the graduates for better positions
as they obtain more experience. The graduates, in turn, are expected to help
other young lawyers from their alma mater and to perform political favors for
members of the school's network. Since most law schools are linked to a
political party, the extent of their network can also be an important factor in
determining the outcome of more general political conflicts. 68
TABLE VII
RESPONDENTS' VIEWS ON THE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF
DIFFERENT FACTORS TO AN ATTORNEY'S
PROFESSIONAL CAREER
Very
Important Important Unimportant
1. Professional ethics 61% 15% 24%
2. Legal knowledge 73% 15% 12%
3. Family's social status 45% 28% 27%
4. Being a professor 40% 39% 21%
5. Publishing 57% 28% 15%
6. Political connections 60o 22% 18%
7. Knoivledge of foreign
languages and legal systems 21% 24% 55%
8. Law School 56% 20% 24%
9. Social relations 78% 15% 7%
There is less cohesion among the graduates of Gran Colombia, Libre, and
National University. These law schools lack continuity in their leadership and
do not have a cohesive alumni association. As a result, many respondents from
these schools feel they have been deprived of the best career opportunities
irrespective of their legal capabilities.
The overall relationship between family status69 and law school70 on the one
68. Historically, Externado, National University, and Libre have been identified with
the liberal party. Javeriana and Gran Colombia are more closely linked to the conservative
party. Rosario graduates appeared to be more of a mixture of both parties. During the
prior conservative government of President Pastrana, Javeriana was commonly regarded
as being very influential.
69. This is the SES variable. See note 67 supra.
70. This variable is based on the three groupings of law schools ranked as follows: 1)
Gran Colombia and Libre, 2) Externado and National U., and 3) Rosario and Javeriana.
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hand, and occupation, 71 type of client,72 field of specialization,7 3 and income on
the other, is consistent with this picture of the way legal careers develop. (See
Table VIII). As noted earlier, the students with well-educated parents work in
high status occupations and are more likely to attend Rosario or Javeriana. The
graduates of these schools have a greater probability of earning a high income
working for business or financial interests as an executive or legal advisor
specializing in commercial law. A graduate of Gran Colombia or Libre tends to
work as a judge or prosecutor for four to five years and then to represent white
collar employees, small merchants, farmers, or workers with problems in civil,
labor, or criminal law.
TABLE VIII
MATRIX OF SPEARMAN CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS AMONG INDICATORS
OF SOCIAL ORIGINS, EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND AND
CURRENT WORKING ENVIRONMENT*
1 2 3 4 5
Type of
Law Clientele or Current Field of
School Employer Occupation Specialization Income
[N=103] [N=1031 [N=103] IN=103] [N=821
Social and .31 .32 .13 .20 .18
Economic Status Sig. .001 Sig. .001 Sig. .089 Sig. .023 Sig. .049
Law School .55 .41 .23 .37
Sig. .001 Sig. .001 Sig. .009 Sig. .001
Type of Clientele .25 .27 .24
or Employer Sig. .006 Sig. .003 Sig. .015
Current Occupa- .27 .55
tion Sig. .003 Sig. .001
Field of Speciali- .24
zation Sig. .013
* For the ranking of categories on SES, Law School, Clientele, Occupation and Field of
Specialization, see notes 69-73 infra.
This pattern of stratification in the bar has created at least two different worlds
of legal practice. The legal advisor74 has a large private office with separate
71. For the ranking of occupations, see Table IV.
72. For the methodology used to determine the major clientele served by each
respondent, see text at note 99 infra and Tables IX, X, & XI. For the correlations, the
respondents' clientele or employers were ranked as follows: 1) mixture of small mer-
chants, workers and campesinos; 2) mixture.of white collar employees and small mer-
chants; 3) mixture of individual clientele and business corporations; 4) unions; 5) medium
size business; 6) government agencies; and 7) large business, foreign interests, large
landowners, high level executives, and professionals.
73. The rankings for field of specialization from low to high prestige were as follows:
1) generalist; 2) debt collection; 3) criminal law; 4) labor law; 5) general practice only in
civil area; 6) administrative and other public law; and 7) commercial law and other
business law fields.
74. For a definition of the difference between legal advisors and litigators, see note 61
supra.
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locations for his secretary and his clients. Most clients either have a permanent
relationship with the legal advisor or have used him previously for specific legal
problems. Clients are treated with deference and have considerable control over
the terms of their relationship with the attorney and the legal actions he takes on
their behalf.
The setting for litigators representing middle and lower-middle class clients is
distinct. Approximately 60% of these lawyers have one small room for an
office. The lawyer's desk is normally on one side of the room, the secretary's on
the other, and clients sit in chairs along the wall or stand in the hall while
waiting to speak with the lawyer. In numerous offices, this researcher waited
with four or five clients and we all overheard the lawyer's discussion with each
client before our turn came. There was little concern for the client's privacy.
Social distance between attorney and client was maintained and there was little
effort to explain legal procedures to the client. The relationships were of a
patron-client character with the lawyer firmly in charge and able to shape the
transaction to protect his economic needs as well as his client's legal interests.
The attorneys working in these two distinct environments have little in
common. The litigators regard legal advisors as business consultants or profes-
sional intermediaries who use personal contacts and a knowledge of government
to make a living. They are disdainful of the legal advisor's inability to litigate.
Similarly, the legal advisors make a point of their distance from the "unethical"
and "undesirable" world of litigation. These divisions within the bar reflect the
class structure and help to maintain class differences. Lawyers serving the
dominant economic interests have higher incomes and enjoy more prestige and
influence in the bar. They, in turn, can use their influence to protect their
clients' interests through the bar's law reform activities and through their control
over legal education and the training of young lawyers. In their legal work, the
attorneys provide the legal forms their clients use to aggregate wealth and to
control the society's productive resources.
Class differences contribute to the individual litigator's capacity to dominate
the attorney-client relationship with middle and lower income groups. Lawyers
serving these clients maintain an aura of expertise combined with social dis-
tance. They can use this aura to help shape an acceptance of the existing social
hierarchy by determining what is a legitimate demand on the political or
economic system. In other words, the demands or needs which people perceive
as legitimate are partially determined by the organization of legal services and
by what the attorneys recognize as a legal right. 75
I. THE ORGANIZATION OF THE PRACTICING BAR
The Colombian bar has been able to protect its monopoly without being
highly organized. Ethical standards are regulated by a special tribunal and, when
functioning, by the superior court of each department.26 Apparently this regula-
75. See Mayhew, Institutions of Representation: Civil Justice and the Public, 9 LAw &
Soc'Y REV. 401, 404 (1975).
76. Decree-Law No. 320 of 1970.
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tory power is rarely applied, however, since 76% of the respondents blamed the
profession's poor public image on the unethical practices of attorneys and felt
that the special tribunal had little impact.
There is a weak national bar association, but few lawyers are members and
many do not even know it exists. 77 The strength of city bar associations varies,
and in Bogotd one did not exist. The professional association with the most
membership among respondents was CONALBOS, which was founded primari-
ly to offer individual attorneys the chance to participate in group insurance and
pensions plans. 78
The only organizations which enjoyed some degree of success as professional
associations were limited to a specific field of expertise such as commercial law,
labor law, or administrative law. 79 There seemed to be three major reasons for
their strength as compared with the national bar association.
First, an association of recognized experts in a specific field is in a good
position to protect its members and the needs of its clients by influencing the
orientation of legal codes and regulations. The government normally relies on
the association to assist in the early drafting of code reforms or relevant
legislation, and even when it is not formally consulted, the association can claim
a special expertise which places it in a strong position to lobby against legal
reforms adverse to its clients' needs.
Second, shared interest in a specific subject matter makes it easier to host
speeches or discussions which are interesting for all members.
Third, the pattern of stratification in legal career patterns described in the
prior section has led to more homogeneity in the social origins, income, and
working environments of lawyers specializing in a particular field than exists
among the profession as a whole."0 This may make it easier to identify common
interests and to cooperate in group activities. At the same time, these differences
cannot be accepted as a complete explanation for the lack of a national associa-
tion because there are strong professional associations in other Latin American
countries and there is little reason to believe that the pattern of stratification in
these countries is much different than in the Colombian bar. In addition, the
differences between the practice of large firms and solo practitioners in the
United States are as great as those encountered in Colombia, but the bar
77. Three percent of respondents said they belonged to a National Colegio de
Abogados, but many respondents also stated that there was no national bar association.
The Colegio did not have an office in Bogota, and no meetings were held during 1973-74
which the author could discover. The Academy of Jurisprudence, a small group of
distinguished legal scholars, judges, and practitioners, said that they often represented the
Colombian Legal Profession at Inter-American Bar Association meetings.
78. CONALBOS stands for the Corporaci6n Nacional de Abogados. Information on
the association was obtained from the Association Secretary who would not discuss any
group objectives other than the creation of group insurance, retirement programs, and
credit to finance housing.
79. The most active appeared to be the Associations of Commercial Lawyers and
Labor Lawyers.
80. See Spearman correlation coefficients in col. 4 of Table VIII.
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association is able to identify sufficient shared interests to maintain its
strength.8
An additional explanation may be the profession's past ability to protect its
monopoly and to limit access without a formal association. Lawyers have
always dominated the legislature. No formal pressure group was necessary to
obtain favorable laws. One of the first acts of the original Colombian Congress
in 1819 was the enactment of legislation creating a system of national courts and
specifying the requirements to represent a private party in litigation.82 Over a
century later, in 1928, members of Congress complained about the competition
"honorable members of the profession" were enduring from uneducated and
unethical persons representing unsuspecting laymen. 83 Legislation was passed to
limit future access to the graduates of law schools.' Finally, in 1945, lawyers
managed to have the requirement of a university degree in law included as an
article in the Colombian Constitution. 85
These restrictions were sufficient to keep down the size of the official
profession prior to this decade because of the limited access to higher education.
Paraprofessionals, or tinterillos as they are called in Colombia, offered legal
services parallel to the official profession, but the competition between the two
groups could not have been very great given the upper class origins of university
graduates and their employment opportunities.
Today the rapid growth of the urban night law schools is changing the
situation. Until recently, the only criterion for access to the bar has been a
university degree.86 Consequently, the expansion of law schools has under-
81. For an interestifig picture of the cross sections of the profession in large United
States cities, see J. CARLIN, LAWYERS ETHICS (1966) and LAWYERS ON THEIR OWN (1962).
82. The requirements were as follows:(a) four years of study in a public school with at least two years devoted to Civil
Law;(b) a bachelor's degree in law and a two-year apprenticeship under a practicing
attorney;(c) monthly visits over two years to a court with attendance certified by a court
clerk;(d) a public examination before three distinguished attorneys;(e) a second examination before the Supreme Court or a superior court; and
(f) to be twenty-one years of age or married.
See H. AGUILERA, supra note 5, at 380.
83. Antecedentes de ley 62 de 1928 in 2-3 COLOMBIA: HISTORIA DE LAS LEYES 556-58
(1928).
84. The legislation finally enacted as Law No. 21 of 1931 required a university degree
for lawyers in order to represent private parties in the future with the exception of lawyers
who had already practiced for five years, taught law for three years, served on a superior
court for four years or the Supreme Court for two years, or had been a high level
government legal advisor for two years. An exception was made for rural areas where
there was no authorized lawyer registered for practice in the local court.
85. COLOMBIA CONST. art. 40.
86. Decree-Law No. 225 of 1977 now requires law graduates to spend one year in
public service as a judge or government attorney or two years as an apprentice in private
law practice according to regulations to be promulgated by the Ministry of Justice. A
requirement of one year's service as a rural judge also existed for a period in the early
sixties, but it was eliminated because of widespread evasion. There is no national bar
examination.
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mined the bar's system for controlling access and limiting competition. At the
time of the interviews, 88% of respondents favored the formation of a national
bar association to cope with the increase in lawyers and competition. The
organizational objectives mentioned most frequently were the 'regulation of
unethical practices and competition, the formation of group plans to provide
practicing lawyers with the same welfare benefits as salaried professionals, the
regulation of the law schools, and the creation of a fixed fee structure to reduce
competition.87 In response to a different question about the profession's major
problems, the most frequently mentioned subjects were the unethical practices
caused by too much competition, the decrease in the quality of legal education
caused by the night schools, and the excessive number of lawyers. In both cases,
the answers provide a picture of a profession worried about its prestige and
economic security. Given the strength of these shared views, one would expect
some action to protect the value of their monopoly position.
Certain steps have been taken, but by the government rather than by an
autonomous private bar association. In 1970 the Ministry of Justice initiated a
new system by presidential decree to register all practicing attorneys.8" Attor-
neys are now required to carry an identification card and the number of the card
must appear on all legal documents filed with the court.8 9 This was done to
restrict the practice of law by paraprofessionals. This same decree charged the
Ministry of Justice with the duty to develop and support a national bar associa-
tion.90
More significant action was taken in 1974. Standards for the operation of a
law faculty were enacted by decree. 91 To open a law school, there must be a five
year lease on an adequate physical plant, 20% of the faculty must be full-time,
the library must have at least 1,000 volumes with 50% in basic areas of study,
and the faculty must offer a complete student welfare program including medi-
cal examinations, a cafeteria, and a sports program. 92 For eventual certification
the requirements increase. No classes can be larger than 100 students and there
can be no more than two parallel groups of 100 students in any entering class
without prior approval of the Colombian Institute for Higher Education
87. The following were the objectives of a stronger bar association mentioned by at
least five percent of respondents:
(a) improve ethical standards-50%;
(b) regulate fees and competition-16%;
(c) control the growth and quality of legal education-13%;
(d) regulate access by reducing the number of law schools and the size of the
night schools--6%;
(e) reform codes and procedures-10%;
(f) develop a program of continuing legal education-5%; and
(g) act as an organized pressure group to obtain welfare benefits and increase
salaries-34%.
88. See Decree-Law No. 320 of 1970.
89. Decree-Law No. 320 of 1970, art. 18.
90. Id. art. 34.
91. Decree-Law No. 1189 of 1974.
92. Id. arts 1,6.
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(ICFES).93 This decree gives the Ministry of Justice and ICFES ample power to
restrict access to the profession.
Both regulations are examples of the private bar's use of government power
to restrict access to the profession and to reduce competition. Neither the
leadership of the private bar nor respondents expressed any concern over the
implications of this government control for the autonomy of the bar. Instead
they criticized the Ministry of Justice for not creating a stronger institutional
infrastructure to enforce ethical standards. This willingness to use the ministry
as a focal point for group organization and control appears to be a reflection of
the linkages between the profession's leadership and the dominant political
groups.
IV. THE ALLOCATION AND COSTS OF LEGAL SERVICES
The Colombian legal profession enjoys a statutorily protected monopoly over
access to the legal process and to government procedures where the applicant is
asking the state to recognize a claim to legal rights or property. 94 There are few
circumstances where the law permits a claimant to take action on his own behalf
or through a nonlawyer intermediary to protect property or individual rights. 95
This state-sanctioned monopoly makes the distribution of private legal services
an important factor in the protection of vested interests or in the recognition of
new rights, and the recent increase in public planning and state control over the
allocation of resources has further enhanced the importance of access to public
decisionmaking.
The introduction to this article raised a series of hypotheses about the relation-
ship between the allocation of legal services and the economic order where the
profession enjoys a monopoly of this type. It was suggested that the fee for
services system of distribution would create a relationship between the highest
paid and most prestigious members of the bar and the groups who control the
country's capital and productive resources. The pattern of stratification within
the Colombian bar is consistent with this hypothesis. The wealthy are more
93. Id. art. 1.
94. See Decree-Law No. 320 of 1970, art. 25.
95. According to Decree-Law No. 320 of 1970, art. 25, which regulates the legal
profession, a nonlawyer can represent himself or someone else in civil litigation or
government procedures only as follows:
(a) when the Constitution or laws grant him the right of individual petition. This
is primarily in reference to article 120 of the Constitution which gives any
individual standing to challenge the constitutionality of a law;
(b) in small claims with a process similar to a small claims court;
(c) at the court of first instance if it is located in a rural community where less
than three lawyers are registered to litigate cases before the municipal judge;(d) in labor conciliation procedures;(e) in the limited jurisdiction of police inspectors in a community with less than
three lawyers;(f) in defense to a legal claim which must be filed by an attorney;(g) before administrative officials if the purpose is not to obtain the recognition
of legal rights or property except in the case of title to less than 50 hectares
of unexploited rural land or in a municipality with less than three lawyers; or(h) in a challenge to a tax assessment.
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likely to aggregate their interests through a business corporation or an invest-
ment company. They have property to protect, a variety of legal needs, and an
incentive to employ the best available legal talent to protect their interests.
In contrast, lower income groups are less likely to have developed in-
stitutionalized methods of aggregating their shared interests. The legal services
they purchase will be oriented toward individual problems where the impact on a
particular family is great enough to justify hiring a attorney.
Those groups who have institutionalized methods of combining legal needs
will be able to use legal services more effectively. 96 To the extent that expert
and continuous advocacy can make a difference in the outcome of government
decisions, the organized groups should be favored over time. 97 In the case of
Colombia, this means private corporations and interest associations of landown-
ers.
These hypotheses raise a number of complex issues about the relationship
between the allocation of legal services on the one hand and the outcome of legal
conflicts and government programs to distribute resources on the other. The data
generated by this study is inadequate to test these ideas, but it does provide some
basis for general impressions about the cost and allocation of legal services
among different types of clientele.
Many respondents were sensitive to questions concerning the cost of their
services and their typical clientele, therefore the inquiries had to be posed in a
way which would not undermine the interviewee's willingness to speak openly.
First, they were asked to estimate the percentage of their income coming from
the following types of clients: (1) large Colombian business (more than fifty
employees), (2) foreign business, (3) medium size business (ten to fifty employ-
ees), (4) small business (less than ten employees), and (5) individual clients.
The results are summarized in Table IX.
96. See Galanter, Why the "Haves'" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of
Legal Change, 9 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 95 (1974).
97. See id.
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TABLE IX
THE PERCENTAGE OF INCOME OF RESPONDENTS ENGAGED IN
PRIVATE PRACTICE COMING FROM PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
INSTITUTIONS AND FROM INDIVIDUAL CLIENTS
[N=61]
SOURCE OF INCOME
Large Colombian
Business (fifty or
more employees)
Foreign Business in
Colombia
Medium Size Busi-
ness (ten to fifty
employees)
Governmental
Agencies Using
Outside Counsel
Small Business (less
than ten employ-
ees)
Unions
Individual Clients
1 2
Five Percent
No Income or More of
from the Respondent's
Source Income
57%
84%
65%
89%
77%
92%
10%
3
Twenty-Five
Percent or
More of
Respondent's
Income
Fifty Percent
or More of'
Respondent's
Income
5
Mean Percentage
of Income
from this
Source for All
Respondents
5% 3% 5%
3% 5%
8% 3% 10%
6% 0% 5%
The major source of income for the practicing lawyers was individual clients,
but 44% of them earned more than half of their income from institutional
clients. 98 About 38% worked primarily for the business community and a select
few in this group worked for foreign companies.
A second question was designed to facilitate the classification of attorneys
who work primarily for individuals. Each of the practicing attorneys was asked
about the frequency of his contact with different types of individual clients
categorized by a combination of social class and occupation. These results are
given in Table X. The responses to the two questions are combined in Table XI
to yield the overall distribution of private attorneys among different clients. 99
98. This includes 7% who have a mixed institutional clientele as well as the 37% who
earn more than 50% of their income from one type of institutional client.
99. Categories one through six of Table XI are based on the percentage of practicing
attorneys receiving 50% or more of their income from the client group. Categories seven
through ten include the private attorneys who earn more than one-half of their income
from individual clients. Category seven includes the attorneys who only have frequent
contact with upper-class clients. The lawyers in category eight have frequent contact with
both upper and middle-class clients. The lawyers in category nine have frequent contact
with employees and small merchants but do not have frequent clients from the upper two
groupings. Category ten includes lawyers who serve mostly small farmers and workers.
Some of them also have frequent contact with small merchants as clients.
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Table XII provides a picture of the relationship between the private attorney's
primary clientele and his field of specialization.
TABLE X
FREQUENCY OF CONTACT OF PRIVATE PRACTITIONERS WITH
DIFFERENT TYPES OF INDIVIDUAL CLIENTELE
[N=61]
TYE OF INDIVIDUAL CLIENTELE Frequently Sometimes Never
1. Professionals or High Level Public Func- 31% 28% 4"1%
tionaries
2. Executives in Private Sector or Large 33% 31% 36%
Landowners
3. Clerical and Middle-level Administrative 38% 11% 51%
Employees in Public and Private Sectors
4. Small Merchants 59% 20% 21%
5. Workers 26% 15% 59%
6. Campesinos 24% 15% 61%
TABLE XI
THE DISTRIBUTION OF PRACTICING LAWYERS AMONG
THEIR POTENTIAL CLIENTELE
[N=611
Percentage of Practicing
Lawyers Working
Primarily for
TYPE OF CLIENT that Client
1. Large Colombian Business 25%
2. Foreign Business 3%
3. Medium Size Business 3%
4. Mixed Business Clientele 7%
5. Unions 3%
6. Government Agencies 3%
7. Professionals, Executives in the Public and Private Sector and 3%
Large Landowners
8. Mixed Individual Clientele with Some Income from Business 20%
Institutions
9. White Collar Employees and Small Merchants 13%
10. Small Merchants, Workers, and Campesinos 20%
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TABLE XII
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TYPE OF CLIENTELE AND
FIELD OF SPECIALIZATION FOR PRIVATE ATTORNEYS
[N=61]
FILO OF LAw
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
TYPE OF Commercial Administra- General Labor Criminal Debt All Private
CLIENTELE Law tive Law Civil Law Law Law Collection Generalist Practitioners
Business
[N=23]
Government
Agencies
[N=2]
Unions
[N=2]
Large Land-
owners,
Executives,
or Profes-
sionals
[N=21
Mixed Indi-
vidual Clientele
[N=12]
Small Mer-
chants and
White Collar
Employees
[N=8]
Small Mer-
chants, Small
Farmers,
and Workers
[N=12]
All Private
Practitioners
[N=611
44% 9% 4% 9% 13% 17% 4% 38%
100%
100%
100%
8% 8% 42% 8% 25% 8%
13% 25% 13% 13%
33% 25% 33% 8%
20% 8% 25% 13% 18% 13% 3% 100%
Several aspects of the results of these questions merit special emphasis. First,
approximately 60% of the practicing attorneys have frequent contact with small
merchants as clients. This is mostly debt collection work which is one of the
"bread and butter" areas for private practitioners.
Second, only about one-third of the practicing attorneys have regular contact
with individual clients from the upper income groups. Over half of these lawyers
already earn most of their income from business institutions. Only two attorneys
had developed a practice which enabled them to serve exclusively large land-
owners, executives, and other professionals.
Third, the results indicate that a sizeable percentage of private practitioners
often have workers and small farmers as clients. Approximately one-fourth of
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the private attorneys frequently work for these clients and about 20% of the
practicing lawyers almost exclusively serve these groups.
These results should not be exaggerated, however, because many skilled
workers make relatively high wages and some campesinos own sizeable
amounts of land. ° On the other hand, the sample probably underestimates the
actual percentage of the Bogoti profession serving these lower-middle and
lower class groups because it is biased toward the elite schools and the more
prestigious occupations. 10 1
The night school graduates account for a much larger percentage of young
practicing attorneys than is reflected in this study.102 Such a result is due to the
stratification of the sample by university without adjustment to account for the
greater number of lawyers graduating from the night schools than from the two
elite schools. This bias is important for any estimate of access to legal services
among the middle and lower-middle classes because approximately one-half of
the respondents providing services to these groups were young graduates of
Libre and Gran Colombia. 03
The recent expansion in the night law schools and the lower quality education
they offer, if respondents are to be believed, suggest a number of hypotheses
related to the cost and quality of legal services. An increase in the supply of
lawyers with more limited social connections and a lower quality education
should cause more competition among litigators representing low income
clients. In the past these people may have been represented by paraprofessionals
or they may have dealt with problems without using the legal process. The
complaints of respondents practicing at this level about excessive competition
from other lawyers and from tinterillos in the form of fee cutting are consistent
with this hypothesis. If it is true, one would also expect the average hourly cost
of an attorney's time serving this group to be less than the hourly fee of an
attorney serving middle or upper income clients.
No direct information about the cost of private legal services could be
obtained to assess the validity of these observations. With the exception of a few
large firms, private attorneys charge clients on the basis of a fee the lawyer and
client agree on in advance. If a claim is involved, it is normally a contingent fee.
100. A number of respondents specializing in estate planning and the probation of will
claimed that many of their campesino clients, whose appearance made them seem poor,
actually had sizeable estates.
101. See text at note 50 supra.
102. According to the statistics kept by ICFES, the government body regulating higher
education, in 1973 there were 8,363 students enrolled in eight officially approved law
schools located in Bogoti. Seventy percent of these students were *enrolled in a law
faculty with alarge night section (Libre, Gran Colombia or Santo Tomis, a Catholic Law
School started in 1969). In addition to this, there were at least two more unapproved night
schools operating with approximately 2,000 additional students. These estimates are based
on data collected by a research assistant who reviewed the ICFES statistics and inter-
viewed the personnel responsible for legal education.
103. Nine of the twenty respondents working for small merchants, white, collar em-
ployees, small farmers, and workers are 1966-67 graduates of Gran Colombia or Libre. All
but one had been a judge or prosecutor prior to starting in private practice.
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Otherwise, the fee is set according to the attorney's estimate of the amount of
time the case will take and the amount at stake in the outcome of the legal
conflict. Almost no attorneys charge by the hour and few are kept on retainer by
business clients. In Bogoti the bar is disorganized and there is no schedule of
even suggested minimum fees. l04
Indirect estimates can be calculated, however, from the income information
given by the forty-five private practitioners who were willing to answer ques-
tions about their current economic situation. The estimates are probably high
because the private attorneys at the lower end of the income scale were less
inclined to discuss personal information. In addition, their offices were small
and often clients were waiting in the same room while the interview was being
conducted. This made asking questions about income and fees almost impossi-
ble.
The mean and median monthly incomes of the forty-five private practitioners
according to the clientele they service are given in Table XIII. The median was
selected for subsequent analysis to keep the high income of any one attorney
from skewing the final results.105 By assuming twenty-two working days in a
month and eight working hours in a day, it was possible to calculate the daily
earnings of the average lawyer serving business and individual clients. 1°6
TABLE XIII
THE MEAN AND MEDIAN MONTHLY INCOME OF LAWYERS IN
PRIVATE PRACTICE CLASSIFIED ACCORDING TO THE
CLIENTELE THEY SERVE
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Private
Practitioners
Serving
Private Employees, Lowest
Private Private Private Practitioners Small Monthly
All Private Practitioners Practitioners Practitioners Serving Merchants, Income of
Practitioners Serving Serving Serving Individual Workers and Private
as a Group Business Government Unions Clients Campesinos Practitioners
[14=45] [N=20] [N=2] [N=I] [N=22] [N=l1l [N=S
Mean 25,300 28,900 65,000 22,000 21,700 20,900 10,000
Income
Median 22,000 30,000 65,000 22,000 20,000 16,000 10,000
Income
Range 10,000 12,000 30,000 22,000 10,000 10,000 10,000
to to to to to
99,000 55,000 99,000 65,000 65,000
104. One respondent claimed that the local Colegio (bar organization) in the city of
Medellin did have a suggested minimum fee schedule.
105. The private practitioner with the highest income claimed to earn 100,000 pesos a
month. Fifty percent of his income was from administrative agencies, 20% from large
Colombian business, 20% from foreign business, and 10% from individual clients. He
shared an office with a national political figure who could not practice according to law.
He regarded himself as a legal advisor to government agencies, but his primary function
was as an intermediary between government and powerful private interests. The next
highest income was 65,000 pesos.
106. The private practitioners who provided services primarily to government agencies
or to unions were included only in the average daily earnings for all practitioners because
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Due to the fact that the lawyers serving business tend to have larger offices,
better furnishings, and more secretarial services, their estimated daily earnings
were increased by 20% to take account of overhead costs. The adjustment figure
used for lawyers serving individual clients was 10% and a figure of 15% was
used to prepare the estimates for the forty-five private practitioners as a group.
Table XIV provides some idea of the average cost of a lawyer's time according
to the clientele he serves based on these figures.
TABLE XIV
AVERAGE DAILY EARNINGS OF PRIVATE PRACTITIONERS AND
ESTIMATE OF AVERAGE COST OF A LAWYER'S TIME
ACCORDING TO CLIENTELE SERVED*
1 2 3 4 5
Serving
Employees,
Private Small
All Practitioners Serving Merchants, Least
Private Serving Individual Workers and Cost
Practitioners Business Clients Campesinos Attorney
[N-'45] [N=20] [N=22] [N=Ill] [N=5]
Daily Earnings
Based on Medi-
an Income 1,000 1,364 909 727 455
Plus Overhead 1,150** 1,636*** 1,000**** 800**** 500****
Cost of 1/2 Day 575 818 500 400 250
Cost of One
Hour 144 204 122 100 62
* based on an assumption of twenty-two working days a month and eight working
hours each day.
** An overhead charge of fifteen percent was added to the base salary.
* An overhead charge of twenty percent was added to the base salary.
**** An overhead charge of ten percent was added to the base salary.
In Table XV the estimates of the average cost of a lawyer's time according to
the clientele he serves are related to the capacity of different types of clients to
purchase one-half day (or four hours) of a practicing attorney's time. The
capacity to pay of each occupational group is based on the median incomes for
each of the seven occupational groupings derived from the National Department
of Statistics information on income distribution in Bogotfi by occupation.
107
Professionals and high level functionaries normally use an attorney who also
works for business interests. At the other end of the spectrum, workers and
laborers probably select an attorney from among those who charge the least.
Thus, the four boxes in Table XV represent the sector of the market for legal
services where the average person in each occupational group would be expect-
ed to look for an attorney.
107. See ENCUESTA DE HOGARES supra note 54, at 26-27, cuadro 19. The DANE data
gives the income distribution for seven occupational categories in 1970 prices. They were
adjusted upward by an index of 170% to allow for the inflation from 1970 to 1974; the
median monthly income for each occupational group then was derived from the table.
Their median daily income was calculated on the basis of 22 working days a month. This
figure provides the basis of the estimate of how many days an average person in each
occupational group must work to purchase four hours of an attorney's time.
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TABLE XV
NUMBER OF DAYS AVERAGE PERSON IN EACH OCCUPATIONAL GROUPING
MUST WORK TO PURCHASE /2 DAY (FOUR HOURS) OF A
PRACICING ATTORNEY'S TIME IN BOGOTA, BASED ON
MEDIAN MONTHLY INCOMES
Profes-
sionals Exe
DAYS EACH GROUP MUST WORK TO HIRE ATTORNEY FOR % DAY
2 3 4 5 6
Clerical Employees
and in Small
Middle-level Commerce Workers Workers
Adminis- and in in
trative Street Service Agricul-
cutives Personnel Vendors Sector ture Lal
7 8
Total
borers Population
All Private
Practitioners 3.1
Private
Practitioners
Serving Busi-
ness 4.4
Private
Practitioners
Serving Indi-
vidual Clients 2.7
Private
Practitioners
Serving Em-
ployees, Small
Merchants,
Workers &
Campesinos 2.2
Least Cost
Attorney 1.3
1.5 5.0 8.0 10.1 10.0 9.3 7.8
2.1
1.3
7.0 11.4 14.4 14.1 13.2 11.1
1.0 13.41
.6 2.1
7.0 8.8 8.6 8.1 6.8
7.0 6.9 6.5 5.4
35 4.4 4.3 4.0 3.4
While the average cost of an attorney's time in serving the lower income
groups is much less than the cost of an attorney serving private institutions and
upper income clients, there is some similarity in the amount of time each
occupational group works to hire an attorney in the market defined by the boxes.
It ranges from a high of 5.5 days to a low of 1.3 days, but most choices are
centered around the three to four day range. The supply of lawyers graduating
from the night schools appears to be fostering a fairly competitive market for
legal services among all types of potential clientele.
As long as the marginal purchasers of legal skills have information on
lawyers' backgrounds, the difference in the price of an attorney's time should
reflect distinctions in the quality of the services. This does not mean it can be
assumed that the higher priced attorney has much better legal skills, since the
client may also be paying a higher fee because of the attorney's social and
political contacts among government decision-makers or judges. In addition,
there is no basis in this study to arrive at any conclusions about whether the
cheapest legal services available in the market are still adequate for the most
common legal problems of low income groups. This is an important issue,
TYPE OF
PRIVATE
PRACTITONER
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however, because of the bar's efforts to restrict the continued expansion of the
night law schools by arguing that the education the night schools offer is inferior
and that their graduates are incapable of practicing law.108 No one mentions the
fact that if these night schools are closed or excessively restricted in the size of
their student body, the result may be to drive up the cost of legal services so that
low income groups have no access to lawyers.
These comparisons of the cost of legal services also fail to reflect the
economies of scale which some firms or individual lawyers may realize through
specialization. By handling similar claims at the same time, an attorney may be
able to reduce the time needed for each without altering the quality of his
services. For example, one respondent divided among three attorneys the legal
work involved in representing laid-off government workers making claims for
welfare benefits from a public agency. No procedural form such as a class action
was available, but by dividing the gathering of evidence, the preparation of
court documents, and the handling of hearings, the firm could process many
more cases than three attorneys working alone. This firm was developing a
reputation for doing good work at a relatively low cost, and the members
claimed they could attract as clients more than half of the people laid off by
certain government agencies.
This type of reorganization in the delivery of legal services to meet the needs
of low income clientele was rare. Normally, the attorney serving these groups
was an individual practitioner specializing in labor, property, wills, or criminal
law. These tended to be the fields where individual low income clients identified
a problem as legal and as having sufficient impact on their lives to merit seeing
an attorney. The labor cases could be handled on a contingent fee basis. In a
conflict over real property or the probation of an estate, the family's basic
economic security would be at stake. Criminal law problems involved the
client's personal liberty.
Attorneys rarely mentioned working for a low income client outside of these
areas. This is not surprising since low income groups in Colombia barely earn
enough to obtain food, housing, and a minimal education for their children.
Hiring an attorney on any basis other than a contingency fee means foregoing
some basic necessity of life for a period of time.
Almost nothing is known about the way the bulk of the population copes with
problems that the more wealthy classes would take to an attorney. Some studies,
focusing on disputes over property, have identified community conflict resolu-
tion procedures which the disputants can use in lieu of the legal process.19 If the
same problem, such as the failure of a public service, is shared by members of a
community, the political parties often provide an avenue for access to the
appropriate government body.' 10 There are also a variety of non-lawyer inter-
108. See note 40 supra.
109. See note 66 supra.
110. During the 1970 Presidential campaign the surprising showing of ANAPO was
partially attributed to the efforts of the ANAPO party over the prior two years to use its
members in government positions and in public utilities to provide new and improved
services to the barrios.
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mediaries who make a living by obtaining important documents or government
rulings for private parties."' They are not formally recognized by the system,
but one only has to visit such places as the office for tax declarations, the public
land registry, or the center for identification of documents to see how prevalent
the intermediaries are. They depend on a system of informal contacts built up
over time through favors and small bribes.
The point of these observations is to stress how little is known about the way
private parties identify a problem as "legal" and about the role lawyers play
within any overall set of alternatives for dealing with problems. Such knowledge
is necessary, however, to assess the potential unintended consequence of any
proposed governmental action to reduce the number of lawyers or to alter the
distribution of legal services through legal aid or other form of public subsidy.
To understand the significance of the way legal services are allocated, it is
also necessary to have some idea of what lawyers do for different clientele. As
noted above, the lawyers representing middle and lower income individual
clients tend to be litigators specializing in property, wills, domestic relations,
labor, and criminal law." 2 The other major area of legal work for litigators is
the representation of banks and commercial enterprises in the collection of debts
through expedited procedures providing for the attachment of a debtor's proper-
ty.
Attorneys who litigate rarely have time to research a case. (See Table XVI).
Approximately two-thirds of their working day is taken up by interviewing
clients and visiting the judicial offices where their cases are pending. For
example, one of the respondents described a typical day as follows:
From 6:00 a.m. to 9:00 a.m., I prepare my written arguments, study
the cases, and organize my day. By about 10:00, I am in the office and
from then until approximately 1:00 p.m. I see one client after another.
After lunch I make my daily visits to the judicial chambers where I
have pending cases and usually I am back in the office between 4:00
and 4:30. Then I see another group of clients until about 6:00 in the
evening.
111. Cf. Rosenn, The Jeito: Brazil's Institutional Bypass of the Formal Legal System
and Its Developmental Implication, 19 AM. J. COMP. L. 514 (1971).
112. See Table XII.
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TABLE XVI
THE PERCENT OF TIME PRACTICING ATTORNEYS DEVOTE TO
DIFFERENT TASKS OR FUNCTIONS DURING AN
ORDINARY WORKING DAY
Average Percent of Time
Devoted to Task Each Day
Litigators Legal Advisors
By TASKS [N=39] [N= 17]
1. Preparing Legal Documents 25% 30%
2. Legal Research 10% 25%
3. Meeting with Clients 35% 20%
4. Visiting the Courts 30% 10%
5. Meeting with Administrative 0% 15%
Officials 100% 100%
BY FUNCTIONAL TYPE OF Litigators Legal Advisor
LEGAL PROBLEMS [N=391 [N= 17]
1. Problems Being Litigated in 85% 15%
the Courts
2. Problems Settled without 15% 35%
Litigation
3. Legal Planning to Prevent Fu- 0% 50%
ture Legal Problems
100% 100%
In contrast, the legal advisors to corporations spend most of their time
negotiating agreements and planning the future affairs of their clients to avoid
legal problems. They tend to work primarily in commercial law, administrative
law, tax, labor, or mining law. Most legal advisors have a few major corporate
clients who are well-organized and who have a precise idea of the legal
problems they want their lawyers to study. Legal advisors spend less time with
their clients than do litigators, and they concentrate on researching legal ques-
tions, drafting contracts or other legal documents, and preparing an analysis of
potential legal problems. 11 3 Only the legal advisors spend much time negotiating
with government officials on behalf of their clients.
In a sense, the legal advisors are intermediaries between private corporations
113. There was a strong statistical relationship between respondent's classification as a
litigator or legal advisor and the percent of time devoted to each task with the exception of
the preparation of legal documents. The correlation coefficient (Kendall's Tau C) between
the two classifications and each task was as follows: documents .17, significance .0289;
research . 47, significance .0000; clients, - .29, significance .0006; visiting court, -.60,
significance .0000; meetings with administrative officials, .50, significance .0006. Positive
value indicates that legal advisors primarily perform the task and negative value reflects
the importance of the activity for litigators.
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or between the state and private centers of power and wealth. 4 The litigators
are intermediaries between individuals in conflict or between private institutions
and individuals. Litigators offer primarily an individualized type of legal serv-
ice. Their clientele in the middle and lower classes lack the information to
identify shared legal needs as well as the methods to aggregate their interests and
to purchase legal services on a group basis. Lawyers have provided the corpo-
rate legal forms to facilitate the organization of the dominant economic interests,
but no similar legal methods have been developed to unify other groups in
Colombia.
V. PROGRAMS TO ALTER THE DISTRIBUTION OF LEGAL SERVICES
There are a variety of ways to supplement the fee for service method of
allocating legal services and thereby to increase access to lawyers by lower
income groups or by unorganized interests which share legal needs. In Colombia
there has been some experimentation with legal aid, and recently a small public
interest law firm was started with partial funding from the Ford Foundation. 115
Serious questions, however, can be raised about the potential success of these
alternatives in the Colombian context.
In the early 1970's, the Colombian government encouraged a bank to estab-
lish and fund a Legal Aid Foundation.116 In a parallel action the Ministry of
Justice promulgated an executive decree requiring all Colombian law faculties to
establish legal aid clinics offering free legal assistance to indigents.117 The
Foundation was to employ approximately ten young attorneys who would
devote half their time to the organization and supervision of the law school legal
aid clinics. The other half would be spent on cases taken directly by the central
Foundation office.
The success of this experiment has been limited. Some law faculties have
taken advantage of the free half-time assistance in the organization of a clinic,
but others refused to cooperate because they feared student political problems
would be caused by the Foundation's link to the government. The Foundation
itself has pursued a cautious course of action. It has kept its services on an
individualized basis and has avoided conflicts which would involve the repre-
sentation of group or community interests against government agencies."18
114. Fifteen of the seventeen legal advisors did receive as much as 20% of their income
from private individual clients. Six devoted this time to representing wealthy individuals,
primarily in the areas of estate planning and contracts, but they also acted as inter-
mediaries before government agencies in some cases. Eight represented a mixed clientele,
but only with private law problems, labor difficulties, or tax problems. One, who worked
for the unions, represented individual workers in labor grievances.
115. This small firm was in the planning stage at the time of this study. It has now been
operating on a small scale for three years, but it is not yet possible to assess its potential
importance.
116. The Banco Popular provided the early funding for the Fundacidn Servicio
Jurfdico Popular.
117. See Decree-Law No. 971 of 1970, Decree-Law No. 1189 of 1974, and Decree-Law
No. 225 of 1977.
118. These observations are based on informal conversations over a three year period
with the Director of the legal aid program and various staff members.
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One of the primary difficulties with this legal aid approach is the underlying
assumption that the fundamental problem is the poor's lack of resources to
purchase legal services. This is a major concern, but it is a limited perspective
on the question of legal services for low income groups. Very little is known
about what low income groups regard as their primary needs and the relevancy
of the legal process to these problems. The criteria they use to identify what is a
"legal problem" will depend partially on the view of the legal process they have
developed over time. Leon Mayhew has succinctly stated the problem:
Needs for legal services and opportunities for beneficial legal action
cannot be enumerated as if they were so many diseases or injuries in
need of treatment. Rather, we have a vast array of disputes, disorders,
vulnerabilities, and wrongs, which contain an enormous potential for
the generation of legal actions. Whether any given situation becomes
defined as a "legal" problem, or even if so defined, makes its way to
an attorney or other agency for possible aid or redress, is a conse-
quence of the social organization of the legal system and the organiza-
tion of the larger society-including shifting currents of social ideolo-
gy, the available legal machinery, and the channels for bringing
perceived injustices to legal agencies.1 19
If one applies this view of legal services to the Colombian context, there is
little reason to assume the poor would use free legal services in a way different
than the way they have used services for a fee. 120 Their contact with the legal
system will normally be a negative experience. Inherent in the legal order of a
capitalist society is the protection of relationships concerned with the allocation
of productive resources.
Security in property and contract rights are basic to the society's incentive
structure, but from the perspective of the poor, these legal rules perpetuate
inequalities in control over property. 121 The poor's past contacts with the legal
system will often have involved a threat to personal liberty through the criminal
process, the taking of personal property to satisfy a debt, the taking of the land
they have farmed if the owner decides to change its use, or, if they have some
family property, the probation of their estate through a complex procedure they
do not understand.122
119. Mayhew, supra note 75, at 404.
120. Without "proactive" organizations demo'nstrating different ways of using law the
tendency will be to follow established routines and to turn to lawyers in those situations
where the poor know, based on past experience, that the legal process may provide some
relief. For a theoretical overview of some of the problems involved in allocating legal
services to the poor, see J. CARLIN, J. HOWARD & S. MESSINGER, CIVIL JUSTICE AND THE
POOR (1967); Galanter, supra note 96; Galanter, The Duty Not to Deliver Legal Services,
30 U. MIAMI L. REV. 929 (1976); Hazard, Legal Problems Peculiar to the Poor, 26 J. Soc.
ISSUES 47 (1970); Marks, A Lawyer's Duty to Take All Comers and Many Who Do Not
Come, 30 U. MIAMI L. REV. 915 (1976); Mayhew, supra note 75.
121. For an interesting critique of the view that law sanctions poverty, see Hazard,
supra note 120.
122. See Table XII for an overview of the areas where low income persons are most
likely to have contact with the legal process.
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When the negative nature of their most frequent contacts with the legal
process is combined with the social distance between the lower class and
lawyers, there is little reason to believe they would identify a problem as
"legal" if an alternative means of coping with it existed. To make the point
another way, if the public funds which would be necessary to mount a meaning-
ful legal aid program were granted to the potential clientele in the form of a
direct payment, there is no reason to believe they would use these funds to
purchase more legal services in the market place.
The organization of a typical legal aid program in Colombia would not tend to
ameliorate their view of the legal process. The normal pattern in Colombia
would be to hire young attorneys willing to work for a lower salary while they
obtain experience and prepare themselves for a legal career serving institutional
clients or the middle and upper classes. They would have no long-run identifica-
tion with the needs of their clients, and their perspective would be that of a
patron who knows what is best for his client. Since the services would not be on
a fee basis, some alternative mechanism such as queuing would be needed to
allocate the services. There is no reason to assume the costs of waiting in line or
similar alternatives will allocate the subsidy in a way that matches the clientele's
most critical legal needs. 23 In addition, legal aid would have to be funded by the
government or powerful private institutions acting at the request of the govern-
ment. The recipient of such funds always operates under a constraint. If they
begin to represent the interests of lower class groups in a fashion which presents
a fundamental challenge to the allocation of power or wealth, their funds can be
cut off and the institution terminated. Consequently, they will tend to favor
individualized legal problems which do not challenge or attempt to change the
existing allocation of legal rights.
In addition, one cannot automatically assume that discouraging people from
identifying a problem as "legal" is necessarily negative. Given the costs of any
comprehensive legal aid program, the resources which would be needed for the
courts to handle more cases, and the social distance of judges and lawyers from
low income clients, encouraging and developing alternative forms of dispute
resolution may be a more sensible course of action. Access to public decision-
makingas contrasted with access to the courts is more fundamental because of
the government's role in resource distribution, but there is no necessary reason
why lawyers should dominate the avenues of access. Political parties, their
leaders, or other types of intermediaries may have a more long-run identification
with the interests of low income groups than university-trained lawyers. It may
be worthwhile to consider ways to encourage other types of community advo-
cates while reducing the scope of the profession's legal monopoly.
This analysis is not meant to suggest that legal aid programs should be
eliminated. The purpose of the criticism is to focus attention on the idea that
legal aid is just one aspect of a much broader perspective on access to law and
123. See Mayhew, supra note 75, at 418-20, for a discussion of the problems inherent
in the alternatives to rationing by fees.
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government by low income groups, and that there may be meaningful alterna-
tives to legal aid which should also be considered. 124
As noted above, the poor's lack of resources to purchase better quality legal
services is partly a function of the organization of the services they have
received. Since the system has primarily offered individualized services, they
lack the information to identify shared legal needs and methods to aggregate
resources for the purchase of legal services on a group basis. The results of this
study indicate that the fundamental disparities in the use of law are less between
rich and poor than between organizations and individuals. Individuals seek out
the services of an attorney in times of personal crisis when their liberty or a basic
property interest is at stake. In contrast, organizations routinely use the same
lawyers on a recurring basis to collect debts, handle claims against the organi-
zation, draft contracts, and mediate with government agencies.
Professor Galanter has pointed out the advantages that "recurrent organiza-
tional players" enjoy over infrequent individual users of the legal process. He
briefly summarizes them as follows:
(1) ability to utilize advance intelligence, structure the next trans-
action, and build a record;
(2) ability to develop expertise and have ready access to special-
ists, economies of scale, and low start-up costs for any case;
(3) opportunity to develop facilitative informal relations with in-
stitutional incumbents;
(4) ability to establish and maintain credibility as a combatant
(i.e., interest in bargaining reputation serves as a resource to establish
"commitment to bargaining positions." With no bargaining reputation
to maintain, the one-time litigant has more difficulty in convincingly
committing himself in bargaining);
(5) ability to play the odds. The larger the matter at issue looms
for the one-timer, the more likely he is to avoid risk (i.e., minimize the
probability of maximum loss). Assuming that the stakes are relatively
smaller for recurrent litigants, they can adopt strategies calculated to
maximize gain over a long series of cases, even where this involves the
risk of maximum loss in some cases;
(6) ability to play for rules as well as immediate gains. It pays a
recurrent litigant to expend resources in influencing the making of the
relevant rules by lobbying. Recurrent litigants can also play for rules in
litigation itself, whereas a one-time litigant is unlikely to. 125
Professor Galanter's analysis suggests that the poor's limited capacity to use
law is not just a question of resources. There is a need to create the opportunity
for them to identify and pursue shared legal needs on a recurrent basis through
the aggregation of resources and rights. The most common method of aggrega-
tion in Colombia is through the formation of interest group associations such as
unions, agricultural federations, and neighborhood community groups. These
124. See Galanter, supra note 96, for a conceptual overview of the alternatives.
125. Galanter, supra note 120, at 937.
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types of associations are common among the more wealthy and politically
powerful segments of the society, but with the exception of the unions, they are
rare among lower income groups. 126
Even if the poor were highly organized, however, there is again no reason to
assume they would make more use of the legal process. The status quo orienta-
tion of the law is inherent in the first principles, which emphasize the protection
of property and contract. Young judges, concerned about their future legal
careers and the impressions they make on powerful interests in the private
sector, are not likely to alter this orientation. Direct political action through
administrative channels or political party structures will probably yield more
results. At the same time, law is an important institution, and there may be some
types of rule or institutional changes which could increase its potential use.
Rule changes to facilitate the representation of aggregated claims are an
example. There is no procedural form in Colombia similar to the class action.
Under some circumstances this procedural device enables the claimants to
achieve the same economies of scale in litigation as an organization. Claims
which, relative to the cost of litigation, are too small or too speculative in
outcome can be combined and made economical. Class actions can also be used
prior to undergoing the cost of organizing and can become a means of dis-
seminating information about shared interests and an avenue to overcome the
transaction costs of organizing.12 7
There are other rule changes of a procedural nature which would also create
an economic incentive for private attorneys to identify and represent aggregate
claims. For example, the legal system could recognize the assignment of
fragmentary rights, not worth the cost of an individual suit, to a "legal mana-
ger" who would monitor the protection of the assigned rights and seek damages
in case of a violation.128 A somewhat different approach would be to require the
losing party in a law suit to reimburse the winning party's attorney fees, but this
could also operate to discourage litigation by lower income groups given their
lack of confidence in the court system.
Both of these alternatives also raise problems.129 They tend to separate the
real client's claim from the litigation process so that the actual victim may never
be compensated. The absence of a real client may also undermine the lawyer's
incentive to seek a solution in the interests of the class of claimants. 130 The
attorney is interested in the size of his fee and not the final judgment. Defend-
126. There is a national association of campesinos with some links to the political
parties and there are juntas de Acci6n Comunal in the barrios organized by the govern-
ment, but they tend to be a political instrument of the party in power rather than a grass
roots organization seeking a way to represent the interests of the community. For a
description of some of the more powerful interest group associations among the dominant
economic groups, see R. Dix, supra note 8, at 322-59.
127. See Galanter, supra note 120, at 943; R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
349-51 (1972).
128. Galanter, supra note 120, at 941.
129. See R. POSNER, supra note 127, at 350-51.
130. Id.
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ants will have an incentive to make a settlement offer that maximizes the
attorney's gain and minimizes the harm to defendant. Unless the judge carefully
controls the settlement process, the results may not be in the best interests of the
actual aggrieved parties. 131
Each of these alternatives is also contrary to the typical rules against champer-
ty. They make lawyers entrepreneurs rather than agents of a client, but this is
also to their advantage. They do not depend on the reallocation of resources.
Instead, they create an economic incentive for lawyers to represent aggregated
private rights.
Finally, there is the example of the labor attorney who reorganized the way
his office delivered legal services to low income groups to take advantage of
economies of scale in handling similar claims. This is an outgrowth of the new
competition among lawyers for low income clients which has accompanied the
expansion in the profession's size. The attorney was a night school graduate,
and he planned to continue in the same type of legal practice. He has a long-run
interest in the development of labor laws which will favor his clients and thereby
improve his fees. Changes in the organization and delivery of legal services of
this type, which are based on the private bar's economic incentives, may have
more impact on meaningful access than any government-subsidized legal aid
program.
The example also suggests that even without such rule changes, there may be
more flexibility in the current legal system than is apparent from this study. The
transaction costs involved in organizing groups, aggregating small claims, and
identifying existing procedural methods to represent group interests are high.
One important role for legal aid or the new outside-funded public interest law
firm is to obtain information of this type and to litigate highly visible group
claims. This could foster the dissemination of information about the economic
potential of group claims and encourage more low income individuals and
private attorneys to explore the alternative of group legal actions.
CONCLUSION
This study has examined the relationship between the distribution of econom-
ic power in Colombia on the one hand, and legal career patterns, stratification in
the bar, and the allocation of legal services on the other. While the organization
of the bar tends to favor and reinforce the existing social and economic order,
lawyers are less a homogenous profession than a loose mixture of subgroups
allied to different types of clientele. There are differences between the formal
rights guaranteed to the bulk of the Colombian population by law and the reality
of the benefits they receive. Whether the legal order can be a useful avenue to
point out these contradictions and to pressure for change seems to depend in
large measure on the development of institutionalized methods for unorganized
groups to identify and pursue shared legal and political goals.
131. Id.
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